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ABSTRACT 
 
The vector autoregression process is used to estimate a reformulated model of the equation of 
exchange developed from the quantity theory of money.  In describing the effect of oil speculation, 
represented by spot oil price, on general price level and the overall economy, new variables are 
incorporated to take into account current global economic conditions and realities.  A variable, 
which was introduced in Ajuzie et al, 2008 paper, import of goods and services, is included and 
impulse-response function is used to forecast future economy and determine policy scenarios.  
Results show that an increase in spot oil price last period has a highly statistically significant 
positive effect on CPI inflation.  This effect is strong enough to eliminate the negative significant 
impact of import of goods and services on CPI inflation found in the paper of May 2008.  Based 
on this finding, it is highly recommended that oil speculation should be discouraged and trade 
relations be bases purely on the principles of comparative advantage.             
 
Keywords:  Oil speculation, inflation, impulse-response function, interest rate, inflationary pressure, equation of 
exchange, quantity theory of money, vector-autoregression, consumer price index, import, growth rate, spot oil 
price, goods and services, general price level, and comparative advantage 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n a previous paper, Ajuzie et al, (2008), we primarily examined the impact of the importation of goods 
and services on consumer price index (CPI) inflation and consequently on the rate of interest.  We 
proposed some policy strategies to return the economy on a healthy path.  One of those recommendations 
dealt with the need to, as much as is possible, stop or reduce oil speculation, which was seen as a buster of economic 
growth.  In order to arrive at that conclusion, a more modern theoretical formulation of the equation of exchange 
was developed.  It incorporated imports of goods and services and oil as new variables that impact the economy and 
inflationary pressures in very significant ways. 
 
This study borrows the formulation in that paper to make the case for the pressing need to examine in-depth 
the consequences of oil speculation on the economy.  In a news article published online by Associated Press 
Monday, June 20, 2008, it was reported that the Congress was holding listening sessions to determine whether or not 
oil speculation has any impact on the economy.  Most of the panelists agreed that, somehow, oil speculation has a 
negative effect on the economy.   
 
This paper employs relevant data to determine the statistical nature of that effect on the economy.  Again, 
we can explain inflation using the quantity theory of money (QTM). The theory emphasizes that money supply is the 
principal determinant of nominal gross domestic product (GDP).  The QTM can be explained with reference to the 
equation of exchange and shows the relationship among money supply, income velocity of money, GDP deflator, 
and real GDP.  This theoretical framework is taken from Ajuzie, et al, 2008 paper referred to above. 
 
THE THEORETICAL MODEL            
 
The reformulated equation of exchange incorporates new variables, which impact United States economy 
on the backdrop of the global economy of the 21
st
 century.  These new variables of interest incorporated in the May 
I 
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2008 paper and led to the expansion of the original equation of exchange are imports of goods and services (IMP) 
and oil import (OIL).  The first equation could be represented as follows:   
 
dM2/M2 + dV/V = dCPI/CPI + dGDP/GDP + dIMP/IMP+ dOIL/OIL         (1) 
 
where dM2/M2 represents the growth rate of the money supply, dV/V the growth rate of the velocity of money, 
dCPI/CPI the growth rate of consumer price index, dGDP/GDP the growth rate of gross domestic product, 
dIMP/IMP is the growth rate of imports of goods and services, and dOIL/OIL is the growth rate of oil import.  We 
use M2 for our money supply measure.  Imports are regarded as the value of all goods and services except oil in 
one-month period.  dOIL/OIL represents the growth rate of oil imports in one-month period.  We replace P, the GDP 
deflator, with CPI inflation since it includes import prices and measures inflationary pressures before they reach the 
consumer.  Therefore, dCPI/CPI becomes the growth rate of CPI inflation.  By holding the velocity of money 
constant, equation (1) becomes: 
 
dM2/M2 = dCPI/CPI + dGDP/GDP + dIMP/IMP + dOIL/OIL                    (2) 
 
Equation (2) states that the growth rate of money supply equals the growth rate of CPI inflation plus output 
growth rate plus the growth rate of imports of all goods and services except oil plus the growth rate of oil import.  
Rearranging terms and solving for the growth rate of CPI inflation we have: 
  
dCPI/CPI = dM2/M2 – dGDP/GDP - dIMP/IMP – dOIL/OIL                              (3) 
 
Equation (3) states that the growth rate of CPI inflation equals the growth rate of money supply minus 
output growth rate minus the growth rate of all imports of goods and services, except oil, minus the growth rate of 
oil import.  In order to examine the impact of oil speculation on inflation, we include that variable in the 
reformulated equation.  Equation (3) becomes: 
 
dCPI/CPI = dM2/M2 – dGDP/GDP - dIMP/IMP – dOIL/OIL – dSTP/STP          (4)                          
 
where dSTP/STP is the growth rate of spot oil price, which is a measure of oil speculation at the Mercantile 
Exchange House.  The assumption is that speculation in spot oil prices leads to acceleration of CPI inflation.  These 
price increases are easily transferred to the consumer and quickly spread through the financial system, leading to 
serious market distortions with unintended dire consequences on the poor, those on low fixed income, retirees, and 
farmers.   
 
With this formulation, we would investigate the effect of changes in the value of oil import, gross domestic 
product, money supply, import of goods and services, and spot oil price on the rate of CPI inflation.  The focus 
would primarily be on spot oil price, STP.   
 
THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
In order to primarily demonstrate the effect of oil speculation on inflation, we propose empirical 
application following Ajuzie, et al (2008). The dynamic model of the macro-economy used is the Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) estimation procedure.  It involves running three-step analyses, namely: 
 
 Test the stationarity for each variable  
 Finding that variables are stationary, use the VAR model for estimation 
 Based on the VAR estimation, perform the impulse-response function for forecast and policy analysis. 
 
The mathematical representation of the VAR is: 
 
ttptptt BxyAyAy   ...11                                                 (5) 
 
where yt = (CPI, GDP, IMP, M2, OIL, STP) is a vector of endogenous variables, the xt is a vector of exogenous 
variables (we let a constant be the only exogenous variable in our model). The A1, A2, …, Ap are matrices of 
coefficients to be estimated, and εt is  a vector of innovations that may be contemporaneously correlated but are 
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uncorrelated with their own lagged values and uncorrelated with all of the right-hand side variables, and the error 
term.  The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to specify the optimal lags as 2 in the VAR system. 
 
Based on Ajuzie, et al (2008), the impulse-response function is used for forecast and policy discussion. We 
use the generalized impulse-response function (Pesaran, M. H. and Shin, Y., 1997) which does not depend on the 
Cholesky order selection as the simple impulse-response generation. A shock to the i
th
 variable not only directly 
affects the i
th
 variable but is also transmitted to all of the other endogenous variables through the dynamic (lag) 
structure of the VAR. An impulse response function traces the effect of a one-time shock to one of the innovations, 
εt, on current and future values of the endogenous variables.  
 
The impulse-response function is plotted in 12-lags/months with 2-standard deviations. For example, the 
response of CPI to OIL implies that a shock in OIL has an immediate positive though insignificant effect of up to 
0.0002% on overall consumer prices. The impact declines and reaches a slightly negative effect in 2 to 3 periods, 
then the effect dies out and the consumer price goes back to equilibrium. 
 
The stationarity was performed using the Augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) model, which can be specified as 
follows: 
 
tptpttttt vyyyxyy    ...' 22111                            (6) 
 
The null hypothesis is Ho: α=1, and the y denotes each variable.  All tests reject the unit-root hypothesis at 
1% significance level, so we confirm that all variables are stationary and a VAR can be specified and used to run the 
regression analysis. 
 
DATA SOURCE: 
 
Secondary data were collected on six variables, namely consumer price index (CPI inflation), Money 
supply (M2), real gross domestic product (GDP), imports of goods and services (IMP), value of crude oil imports 
(OIL), and speculative spot oil price (STP).  Monthly data were collected on these variables from January 1993 
through June 2008, yielding a total of 186 observations.  The quarterly GDP data were extrapolated to monthly data.  
Then the data on the six variables were converted to growth rates for purposes of estimation, resulting in a reduction 
in the number of observations to 185.    Sources of the secondary data are the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and US Bureau of the Census.   
 
RESULTS 
 
Table 1 below is the augmented Dickey –Fuller (ADF) Test.  As stated above, the tests reject the null-root 
hypothesis at 1% significance level.  This led to the confirmation that all variables are stationary and that VAR 
could be specified.   
 
Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test  (The Null Hypothesis: Has a Unit Root)
Variable T-statistics
CPI -10.46812 ***
M2 -9.24263 ***
GDP -11.39255 ***
IMP -4.692783 ***
OIL -15.15354 ***
STP -11.91868 ***
Notes: The *** denotes the significance at 1% level. The critical values of ADF test statistics
are -3.47, -2.88, and -2.58  at 1%, 5% , and 10% significant levels respectively.     
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 Table 2: Vector Autoregression Estimates
CPI M2 GDP IMP OIL STP
CPI(-1) 0.122895 -0.17385 -0.028599 -0.22733 -4.108774 -10.5911 ***
(0.08660) (0.12563) (0.11941) (0.63639) (3.75492) (2.96678)
[ 1.41903] [-1.38382] [-0.23949] [-0.35722] [-1.09424] [-3.56988]
CPI(-2) -0.23145 *** -0.10812 -0.170907 0.788337 -2.633595 -2.83557
(0.08474) (0.12292) (0.11684) (0.62265) (3.67386) (2.90274)
[-2.73141] [-0.87963] [-1.46280] [ 1.26609] [-0.71685] [-0.97686]
M2(-1) -0.0617 0.29004 *** 0.020389 -0.58131 -0.374354 -1.02967
(0.05265) (0.07637) (0.07259) (0.38687) (2.28265) (1.80354)
[-1.17188] [ 3.79772] [ 0.28088] [-1.50261] [-0.16400] [-0.57092]
M2(-2) 0.033228 0.14298 * 0.036846 -0.4565 1.780301 1.537077
(0.05224) (0.07578) (0.07203) (0.38387) (2.26496) (1.78956)
[ 0.63605] [ 1.88674] [ 0.51154] [-1.18919] [ 0.78602] [ 0.85891]
GDP(-1) -0.00898 -0.0872 0.181014 ** 0.743893 * -0.224064 -2.79537
(0.05444) (0.07897) (0.07506) (0.40003) (2.36032) (1.86491)
[-0.16489] [-1.10424] [ 2.41151] [ 1.85958] [-0.09493] [-1.49893]
GDP(-2) -0.03506 -0.25533 *** -0.084293 0.278519 0.269908 2.088316
(0.05531) (0.08023) (0.07626) (0.40642) (2.39801) (1.89468)
[-0.63397] [-3.18252] [-1.10532] [ 0.68530] [ 0.11256] [ 1.10220]
IMP(-1) -0.00427 0.01611 0.011846 -0.26776 *** 0.419643 0.731028 **
(0.01053) (0.01528) (0.01452) (0.07740) (0.45667) (0.36081)
[-0.40507] [ 1.05448] [ 0.81568] [-3.45963] [ 0.91893] [ 2.02605]
IMP(-2) 0.007889 -0.00238 0.033411 ** -0.15478 ** 0.418369 0.664262 *
(0.01050) (0.01523) (0.01448) (0.07717) (0.45532) (0.35975)
[ 0.75121] [-0.15605] [ 2.30741] [-2.00576] [ 0.91884] [ 1.84643]
OIL(-1) 0.000209 0.00121 0.003904 -0.02497 * -0.542925 *** -0.12891 **
(0.00189) (0.00274) (0.00261) (0.01390) (0.08199) (0.06478)
[ 0.11063] [ 0.44015] [ 1.49717] [-1.79708] [-6.62185] [-1.98997]
OIL(-2) 0.000515 0.00126 0.000782 -0.01498 -0.144757 * -0.00778
(0.00174) (0.00253) (0.00240) (0.01280) (0.07552) (0.05967)
[ 0.29581] [ 0.49737] [ 0.32547] [-1.17018] [-1.91685] [-0.13034]
STP(-1) 0.011178 *** -0.00115 -0.001652 0.090087 *** 0.915531 *** 0.273499 ***
(0.00271) (0.00393) (0.00374) (0.01991) (0.11747) (0.09282)
[ 4.12553] [-0.29195] [-0.44225] [ 4.52473] [ 7.79342] [ 2.94663]
STP(-2) 0.001491 -0.00091 -0.004527 0.036833 * 0.60585 *** 0.134636
(0.00301) (0.00436) (0.00415) (0.02209) (0.13034) (0.10298)
[ 0.49600] [-0.20941] [-1.09222] [ 1.66735] [ 4.64813] [ 1.30734]
C 0.002554 *** 0.00387 *** 0.002061 *** 0.010441 *** 0.014414 0.02927 *
(0.00045) (0.00065) (0.00061) (0.00328) (0.01934) (0.01528)
[ 5.72622] [ 5.98147] [ 3.35122] [ 3.18581] [ 0.74539] [ 1.91568]
 R-squared 0.254813 0.2208 0.090445 0.210516 0.371555 0.149127
 Adj. R-squared 0.20221 0.16579 0.02624 0.15479 0.32719 0.08907
 Akaike information criterion -37.4284
Notes: The ***, **, and * denote the significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The (.) is the standard
the standard error and the [.] is the corresponding t-statistic
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Table 2 represents the VAR estimation, which uses the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to specify the 
optimal lags as 2 in the VAR system.  The (.) represents the standard error and the [.] denotes the test-statistics.  For 
the sake of space within the Table, the p-values for determining the significance levels of the estimates could not be 
displayed.  
 
The VAR regression estimate is based on past information.  It is a 5-GLS regression systematically, so each 
column is one corresponding variable/regression estimate.  For example, the estimate of CPI is: 
 
CPIt = 0.12*CPIt-1-0.23*CPIt-2-0.06*M2t-1+0.03*M2t-2+0.01*GDPt-1-0.04*GDPt-2-0.004*IMPt-1+0.01*IMPt-
2+0.0002*OILt-1-0.0005*OILt-2+0.01*STPt-1+0.001*STPt-2                                         (7) 
 
For instance, at a 1% level of significance, we can say that an increase in the spot oil price, STP, in the last 
period has a highly statistically significant positive effect of 0.011, on CPI inflation.  It still has a positive effect, 
0.001, into the second period though no longer statistically significant.   
        
Other variables could be calculated similarly.  For example, the estimate of M2 is as follows: 
 
M2t=-0.17*CPIt-1-0.11*CPIt-2+0.29*M2t-1+0.14*M2t-2-0.09*GDPt-1-0.26*GDPt-2+0.02*IMPt-1-0.002*IMPt-
2+0.001*OILt-1-0.001*OILt-2-0.002*STPt-1-0.0009*STPt-2                                                                  (8) 
 
THE IMPULSE RESPONSE FUNCTION 
 
We present the model-generated impulse responses of the variables, especially of CPI to spot oil price 
(STP).  The impulse-response function is a forecast of the future economy based on all current information.  For 
instance, an unexpected increase in the spot price of oil in time t=0 has an immediately positive effect on CPI 
inflation at time t=0 and t=1. Over time, t=2 and 3, the effect is gradually decreased and the escalating effect at time 
t=0 on CPI inflation disappears at time t=4. 
  
In Figure 1, we show CPI response to STP.  It would be reasonable to suggest that a sudden increase in the 
speculative spot oil price significantly increases the CPI inflation immediately.  The increase continues through the 
first and second periods but this immediate effect will decrease and die off with the real fact reorganization or 
economic stabilization over time, approximately within three to four periods.  The disturbing observation with oil 
speculation, especially between May and September 2008, was that the initial STP shock was not given time to die 
off before other more intense shocks were introduced in quick successions.  This resulted in the pressure for CPI 
inflation to escalate continuously and ripple throughout the economy, exacerbating recessionary imperatives.  The 
data used in this study include the highest STP of $147.45, which was reached in a trading day in mid-July 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Response of CPI to STP 
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The economy has been quite resilient and inflation has not escalated as would have been the case if 
imported cheaper goods and services were not offsetting potential rises in the price of domestic output.  It would be 
interesting to briefly and closely compare this and the result in Ajuzie, et al, 2008 with regard to the behavior of 
IMP, CPI, and STP.  Figure 1 shows the inclusion of STP.  In the May paper, which excluded STP, IMP had a 
statistically significant negative impact on CPI inflation.  In other words, IMP reduced the growth rate of CPI 
inflation significantly.  In this analysis IMP, Figure 2, still has negative impact on CPI inflation but only in the first 
period and it is conspicuously statistically insignificant.  We can make the case that since the only thing that 
changed in the two models is the inclusion of STP in this formulation, the non-statistical significance of IMP in this 
model is attributable to the continuous offsetting influence of STP.  It significantly counter-balances the effect of 
IMP in holding off inflationary pressures.  This means that as speculatory prices of oil escalate and reach gasoline 
pumps, we have constant inflationary pressures.  However, the force would be somewhat dampened by IMP in the 
first period even though it is statistically insignificant.     
 
A close examination and comparison of Figures 1 and 2, gives much weight to this argument.  The shock 
from STP on CPI in Figure 1 is almost twice the shock from IMP in Figure 2.  Again, in Ajuzie et al, 2008, we 
found that IMP reduced the growth rate of CPI inflation.   Oil speculation, because it eliminates the significance of 
the power of IMP to reduce the growth rate of CPI inflation, threatens to put us back into constantly worrying about 
inflationary pressures in the economy, which mitigating policy strategies to adopt, and when to adopt them in order 
to attain full employment, stable prices, and low inflation; the main goals of the resilient economy of the United 
States.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Response of CPI to IMP 
 
 
The impact of M2 and GDP on CPI inflation is insignificant, and the effect dies off quickly. The response 
of CPI to OIL implies that a shock in crude oil prices has an insignificant immediate positive effect of up to 
0.0002% on overall consumer prices in the first period, Figure 3.  With a response of .0005% in the second period, it 
is still insignificant. The impact steadily declines and reaches a slightly negative effect in the third period, then the 
effect dies off and the consumer price goes back to equilibrium.   
 
The increase in the price of crude oil (OIL) results from an increase in the speculatory price of oil.  In other 
words, the price of crude oil at the source of production is determined by, or derived from, the STP.  The 
insignificance of the impact of GDP on CPI inflation is symptomatic of the fact that as aggregate domestic demand 
outpaces aggregate domestic supply, the staggering importation of cheap goods and services is used to augment 
domestic supply deficiency, resulting in reduced incentive to bid up the price of domestic output and leading to 
reduction in the escalation of inflation.  This is evidenced by the skyrocketing U.S. trade deficit and tends to make a 
strong case for open economy and trade among nations strictly based on the principles of comparative advantage.  
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Figure 3:  Response of CPI to OIL 
 
POLICY IMPLICATION 
 
1. Oil speculation should be discouraged as much as possible.  This is one of the causes of the present 
financial crisis.  The rise in STP led to escalating general price level and the demise of some businesses as 
they could not cope with increased energy costs.  The decrease in STP in the previous few months led to a 
great loss of assets by big investors who waged their fiscal hopes on the fast rising STP.  
2. Interest rate should be kept low and monitored using equation (15) in Ajuzie et al, May 2008 as a 
benchmark.  Under this principle, interest rate could continue to go down. 
3. Commercial banks should be pressed to lower their business and consumer lending rates to reflect the 
reduction in Federal funds and discount rates, even if there is no direct link between the rates.  It would 
loosen credit and spur investment borrowing, job creation, and home purchase or refinancing. 
4. As we gradually work toward the development of solar and wind energy, we should immediately rely 
mostly on the use of technology to get us out of the dependence on foreign oil.  For example, some new 
catalic converter could dramatically increase the fuel efficiency of automobiles.  This is capable of saving 
millions of barrels of oil a day when half of the cars in the nation are converted. 
5. If we follow the principles of comparative advantage in our trade relations, imports would continue to 
reduce the growth rate of inflation and there would be no fear of deflation in the economy as some have 
broached.      
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
 
In Ajuzie, et al, 2008, several recommendations were put forward to assist in reducing the financial crisis 
the nation’s economy is facing.  One of them dealt with the need to regulate or reduce the speculation in crude oil.  
That conclusion was reached by examining the impact of oil import on general price level.  We found that the effect 
was positive in the first period and negative in the second period.  Both effects were statistically insignificant and 
disappeared by the third period.   
 
In this paper, crude oil import price is not a factor as it becomes even more statistically insignificant in its 
effect on CPI inflation.  The negative second period estimate in the first analysis turned positive here, though 
insignificant.  On the other hand, the new variable STP, which is a measure of oil speculation, is positive and highly 
statistically significant at the one percent level of significance.  This implies that in the first period oil speculatory 
price shock raises CPI inflation by 0.01 percentage point.  At 0.001 percentage point, it remains positive in the 
second period, though no longer statistically significant.  The effect does not die down until about the fourth period.   
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We therefore conclude that it is not really crude oil prices that drive the price of gasoline at the pump but 
speculatory prices of oil.  In other words, crude oil prices react to, or are derived from, STP.  The data used in this 
study include the highest STP in mid-July 2008, which was recorded at $147.45 per barrel. 
 
  What does it all mean?  We can infer that the skyrocketing increases in the speculatory prices of oil, STP, 
were driven not necessarily by the forces of supply and demand but by other economic concerns and aspirations of 
global capitalistic societies, with everyone pursuing his/her own self interest.  The implication is that the 
unwarranted increases in the STP led to soaring energy costs, which in turn resulted in high cost of doing business, 
the bankruptcy of businesses, declining output, lay off of workers, reversal of economic growth, and great 
uncertainties in financial markets.  As STP declines from its highest level in July 2008, many large investors who 
waged their hopes on a continuously soaring STP lost substantial amount of assets, resulting in financial meltdown, 
recession, and “bailouts” to stay afloat.    
 
With the ballooning prices of oil, some oil producing countries used the windfall to invest in noneconomic-
growth sectors instead of capital accumulation, which would enable them to increase future production and enhance 
economic growth.  As the price of oil falls, one can only speculate what the future would be for all those investments 
in nonproductive ventures.  We are not implying here that oil speculation is the only culprit in the mess we are in 
now, but its role is quite significant and any strategy to reduce that effect would be a step in the right direction. 
 
The need to operate in commodity markets to maintain steady purchases and delivery processes of goods 
and services, especially oil, cannot be over emphasized.  The nation’s economic health demands that we have 
uninterrupted production and supply of energy and the commodity market in crude oil assures us of a continuous 
flow of the resource.  However, because of its extraordinary ability to positively impact the general price level and 
lead to inflation and all the attendant economic ills, we recommend that oil should not be the target of intense 
speculation. What has happened in the past year or so is that our capitalistic drive saw the apparent inelastic demand 
for oil by nations and decided to accrue inordinate amount of profits regardless of its effect on global economies.   
 
As this paper is being put together, oil speculation is gradually easing and crude oil prices are declining.  
This is being reflected slowly at gasoline pumps.  Consumers are going to use the savings from gasoline to purchase 
other goods and services, a process that would increase production and begin to spur economic growth, all things 
being equal.  Import of goods and services would resume its power of ameliorating inflationary pressures in the 
economy.  Interest rate would react by remaining low; a situation that would improve business borrowing for 
investment purposes, consumer borrowing to refinance or buy new homes, and by farmers to purchase farm 
equipment.   
 
The loosening of credit would be achieved by lowering consumer lending rate to reflect the low federal 
funds and Federal discount rates even if they are not directly related.  At the time this paper was presented at a 
conference in March 2009, there was a fear of deflation.  This study shows that that fear was speculatory, not 
founded and evidential.  At the time, and before the present increase in oil speculation, we were observing import of 
goods and services resuming its effect on reducing the growth rate of inflation, and thus the prices of goods and 
services.  If we do not check this current pressure on oil speculation, we will witness stalling economic and jobless 
recovery.    
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